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Is Forward-Looking Financial Disclosure Really Informative? Evidence 
from UK Narrative Statements  
 
 
Abstract: 
Forward-looking financial disclosure (FLFD) is potentially uninformative if it 
does not change from the previous year, especially after a significant change in 
firm performance. This study aims to examine whether and to what extent FLFD 
is changed in response to changes in firm performance. Then, it investigates the 
effect of such change in FLFD on firm value. The study uses a sample of UK 
narrative statements over the period from 2005 to 2011. It finds an association 
between change in FLFD and change in firm earnings performance. However, it 
finds weak evidence that firms with larger changes in earnings performance are 
likely to change their FLFD more than those with smaller performance changes. 
In addition, when we distinguish between well-performing and poorly 
performing firms, it finds that the change in FLFD is more positively associated 
with poorly performing firms compared to well-performing firms. Finally, the 
change in FLFD has no effect on the value of well-performing firms, while, it 
negatively affects poorly performing firms. The results suggest that forward-
looking financial information in UK narratives contains some relevant 
information about firm performance. However, it neither affects the value of 
well-performing firms nor enhances investors’ valuation of poorly performing 
firms.          
  
Keywords: Narrative Reporting; OFR; Forward-Looking Financial Disclosure; Firm 
Performance; Firm Value 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Narrative reporting in annual reports complements financial statements and provides a 
channel for managers to convey textual information about their firms to market participants 
(Merkley, 2014). Nonetheless, market participants analyse narratives when making their 
decisions to bridge the gap between financial statements amounts and the economic reality 
of firms’ performance (Feldman, Govindaraj, Livnat, & Segal, 2010; Merkley, 2014). 
Recently, the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) has worried about how 
informative narrative information is and has advised firms to avoid providing boilerplate 
disclosures. It is argued that "management should avoid generic disclosures that do not relate 
to the practices and circumstances of the entity and immaterial disclosures that make the 
more important information difficult to find" (IFRS, 2010, P. 12).  
A natural question is whether narratives have informational content or simply boilerplate 
disclosures (i.e., standard disclosures with little firm-specific content). Narrative statements 
might not be as informative as intended for several reasons. First, managers have flexibility 
in choosing the breadth and depth of disclosed information. Accordingly, after considering 
the costs of preparing long narrative document, managers may simply use the previous 
year’s narrative statements as templates for current and future years (Brown & Tucker, 
2011). Second, the qualitative nature of narratives makes them difficult to be audited and, 
therefore, many include substantial boilerplate disclosures, generic language, and 
immaterial details (Li, 2010a).  
The Operating and Financial Review (OFR) is a key narrative reporting medium 
recommended by the Accounting Standard Board (ASB) for financial reporting in the United 
Kingdom (UK). It aims to provide analysis of a business through the eyes of the board of 
directors (ASB, 2005; ASB, 2006). The ASB recommends the analysis of the business in 
OFR statements to have a forward-looking orientation (ASB, 2005; ASB, 2006). This 
information would help investors to assess firms’ past and current financial performance, 
and to predict future earnings (Hussainey, Schleicher, & Walker, 2003). 
In essence, a document that is similar to the previous year’s version does not reveal 
considerable new information. This study uses change in FLFD in OFR statements over 
years to answer two research questions. First, whether and to what extent do firms’ managers 
change FLFD in response to change in firms’ current performance, if they do at all? Second, 
do investors respond to information revealed by change in FLFD? If FLFD level is changed 
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(updated) in response to change in firm performance, it will include some informational 
content about firm performance and, thus, offers relevant information for investors.  
The study considers change in FLFD in the UK for the following. The UK provides a unique 
context to analyse the FLFD. In the UK, FLFD is qualitative in nature and is not immediately 
verifiable or auditable (Wang & Hussainey, 2013; Athanasakou & Hussainey, 2014). This 
nature might encourage firm managers to use the previous year’s FLFD as a template from 
year to year. The change in FLFD from the previous year reveals considerable new 
information that reflects change in the business environment. For instance, Muslu, 
Radhakrishnan, Subramanyam, and Lim (2011, P. 10) argue that "a firm that is planning to 
expand operations overseas or introduce new product lines will add narratives on how initial 
setup will proceed". As such, the additional narratives are free of boilerplate disclosures and 
are more likely to indicate changes in the business environment. Furthermore, Merkley 
(2014) argues that for narrative reporting to perform its function, managers must be willing 
to change it based on changing financial performance of a firm.  
This paper offers three contributions. First, it contributes to the body of knowledge on 
methodological developments in both measurement of FLFD and the estimation method in 
the empirical tests. Unlike prior research on forward-looking disclosure in UK narratives 
(e.g., Hussainey et al., 2003; Schleicher, Hussainey, & Walker, 2007; Wang & Hussainey, 
2013), the study uses change in FLFD rather than their respective levels. Adopting change 
measure can better capture new information that is free of boilerplate statements and reflects 
change in the business environment (Muslu et al., 2011). In addition, this method mitigates 
the problem of endogeneity (Li, 2010b) and provides more robust results (Feldman et al., 
2010); it also alleviates the measurement noise due to repetitive statements (Muslu et al., 
2011). Furthermore, the study uses the OLS regression with robust standard error clustered 
by firm to mitigate the residual dependence problems caused by time effect 
(heteroskedasticity) and firm effect (auto-correlation). This estimation method accounts for 
the residual dependency problems frequently neglected in market-based accounting research 
(Gow, Ormazabal, & Taylor, 2010).  
Second, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first UK evidence that examines the extent 
to which firms change their FLFD from the previous year in response to change in 
performance. The study finds an association between change in firms’ earnings performance 
and change in FLFD. It, however, finds evidence that firms with larger changes in earnings 
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performance are likely to change their FLFD more than those with smaller performance 
changes. Furthermore, the change in FLFD is more positively associated with poorly 
performing firms compared to well-performing firms. Given that IASB concerns about the 
informativeness of narrative reporting, this study provides fresh evidence that FLFD in UK 
narratives contains some information about firm performance. 
Third, prior empirical research assesses the value relevance of forward-looking statements 
in the UK narratives for predicting firms’ future earnings (e.g., Hussainey et al., 2003; 
Schleicher et al., 2007; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). This study extends the literature on the 
infomativeness of FLFD by examining the effect of the change in these statements on firm 
value. The findings indicate that FLFD neither affects the value of well-performing firms 
nor enhances investors’ valuation of poorly performing firms. These findings add to our 
understanding on the usefulness of forward-looking information in narrative reporting. 
The reminder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical 
framework; it draws on the relevant theories, and literature to formulate the research 
hypotheses. Section 3 details the research design. Section 4 presents the findings. Section 5 
introduces further analysis and a robustness check. Section 6 concludes. 
2. THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK  
2.1 Theories  
Managers’ decision to change FLFD over years is based on 1) the likelihood that managers 
have new information to disclose relative to the prior year, and 2) the costs of including 
more or less information in the narrative document. Therefore, the theoretical prediction is 
based on the following theories: 
2.1.1 Managers’ incentive theories 
Managers’ incentives to change narrative reporting could be explained through agency and 
signalling theories (Beyer, Cohen, Lys, & Walther, 2010).  
2.1.1.1 Agency theory: Managers with new information relative to the prior year may 
disclose it voluntarily to reduce information asymmetry and agency costs. When 
performance declines relative to the prior year, owners demand more information to better 
6 
 
assess the uncertainty of future cash flow and, in turn, managers provide more information 
(e.g., forward-looking information). 
2.1.1.2 Signalling theory: Managers with good news disclose this information voluntarily to 
signal their good news to avoid being pooled with managers of bad news. Furthermore, 
managers with bad news information (e.g., losses) may disclose it voluntarily to signal their 
capabilities and strengths to eliminate losses in the future. 
2.1.2 Cost of disclosure theories 
Managers’ decision to change disclosure over years depends on the costs of including more 
or less information. These costs include:  
2.1.2.1 Direct costs: On one hand, firms may have enough resources to cover the direct costs 
of disclosure (e.g., preparation costs); therefore, they are likely to update their disclosure 
over years. On the other hand, companies may simply cut and paste from previous years’ 
disclosures in order to save preparation costs.  
2.1.2.2 Political costs: Watts and Zimmerman (1978) argue that politically visible firms are 
likely to disclose information voluntarily. They are likely to update their disclosure regularly 
to limit their boilerplate disclosures to avoid the political costs of being perceived as being 
ambiguous. 
2.1.2.3 Proprietary costs: This represents competitive disadvantage, because the extension 
in disclosing information by companies leads to additional information to be used by their 
rivals (Radebaugh & Gray, 1997). Therefore, proprietary cost of disclosure may influence 
managers to avoid disclosing information that may help their competitors.  
2.1.2.4 Litigation costs: Healy and Palepu (2001) argue that litigation costs have two great 
effects on companies’ disclosure decision. First, lawsuits against companies for their 
insufficient disclosure may be an incentive for them to increase their disclosure. Second, 
litigation costs can reduce managers’ incentives to provide narrative disclosure.  
2.2 Literature and hypotheses development 
This section reviews the two strands of the literature that are relevant to the current study 
and then we formulate the research hypotheses. The first strand relates to the association 
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between change in firm performance and change in FLFD. The second focuses on investors’ 
response to change in FLFD.  
2.2.1 Change in FLFD and change in firm performance 
The association between disclosure and performance could be hypothesised either positively 
or negatively. A positive association may be explained on the basis that managers of 
profitable firms tend to provide more discussion and analysis about their performance to 
signal their favourable results to investors. A negative association may be hypothesised on 
the basis that information asymmetry increases as performance decreases (Rogers & Van 
Buskirk, 2009). Hayn (1995) argues that as earnings performance decreases, the earnings 
signal becomes noisier and the reported disclosure becomes less predictive of future 
performance. Thus, investors demand more information to better assess the uncertainty of 
future cash flows and, in turn, managers provide more discussion and analysis.  
Literature on the relationship between performance and FLFD reports mixed results. Miller 
and Piotroski (2002), for example, find a positive association between performance and 
forward-looking information. On the other hand, Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2011) and Wang 
and Hussainey (2013) find a negative association between profit-making firms and forward-
looking disclosure. In addition, Schleicher et al. (2007) find that loss-making firms provide 
more relevant forward-looking information to investors than profit-making firms. Despite 
the above-mentioned research, to what extent FLFD is changed from the previous year is 
largely unexamined. FLFD is a qualitative soft talk (vs. hard facts) and is not verifiable or 
auditable. This nature may encourage managers of firms to use the previous year’s FLFD as 
templates from year to year. 
A change in a firm performance reveals considerable new information. This suggests that 
managers do have information to disclose to investors. Besides, managers of firms have 
incentives to disclose and update disclosure in response to changes in performance to reduce 
information asymmetry. Moreover, prior studies (e.g., Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Miller, 
2002; Merkley, 2014) suggest that change in the level of disclosure is associated with change 
in firm performance.  
In a recent paper, Brown and Tucker (2011) find that firms with larger changes in their 
economic environment change their narratives more than those with smaller economic 
changes. Consequently, if managers follow the spirit of OFR statements, we expect them to 
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provide discussion and analysis of firms’ performance with a forward-looking orientation, 
and update their discussions over years in response to changes in performance. Furthermore, 
firms’ managers with larger changes in their performance are expected to change their 
narratives more than those with smaller performance changes. Therefore, the following 
hypotheses are set:  
H1a: A positive association exists between change in firm performance and 
change in FLFD. 
H1b: Firms with larger changes in their performance are likely to change 
their FLFD more than those with smaller performance changes.  
In this section, the change in firm performance is held constant to examine the factors that 
may drive managers to change FLFD. These factors are used to test the validity of the 
disclosure change score. Based on relevant literature, these factors are firm size, competitive 
environment, litigious environment, managerial ownership, and auditor type.  
Firm size: Firm size is expected to be positively associated with change in FLFD for the 
following reasons. First, consistent with signalling theory, large firms are under pressure to 
provide relevant information to their financial analysts (Iatridis, 2008). Second, large firms 
are politically visible and tend to update their disclosure regularly to limit boilerplate 
narratives to avoid the political costs of being perceived as being ambiguous. Third, large 
firms are able to afford the preparation costs of narrative document (Lang & Lundholm, 
1993) or small firms might be more likely to cut and paste narratives from previous year in 
order to save preparation costs. Therefore, the study hypothesises that: 
H2a: A positive association exists between firm size and change in FLFD. 
Competitive environment: Verrecchia (1983) argues that when proprietary costs exist, 
information is withheld. Consistently, managers’ incentives to disclose additional 
information appear to be sensitive to the nature of competition (Healy & Palepu, 2001). 
Empirically, Brown and Tucker (2011) find that firms facing more competition are less 
likely to change their narrative reporting in MD&A and, therefore, provide less informative 
narrative disclosure. Hence, it may be expected that firms in a more competitive 
environment – where preparatory costs are high – are less likely to provide informative 
future-oriented information. Consequently, these firms are less likely to change their FLFD 
over years. Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
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 H2b: A negative association exists between competitive environment and 
change in FLFD.  
Litigious environment: Litigation is costly and firms have an interest in adopting policies of 
disclosure that reduce litigation costs (Lowry, 2009). On one hand, firms in more litigious 
environment are expected to update their FLFD over years in order to avoid the claim that 
they withhold relevant information from the market, which limits the potential litigation 
costs (Cox, Hillman, & Langevoort, 2001). On the other hand, firm may minimise its 
obligation to update the reported disclosure by reducing the initial information voluntarily 
disclosed (Rogers & Van Buskirk, 2009). Empirically, Brown and Tucker (2011) find that 
firms in a more litigious environment change their narrative reporting in MD&A to larger 
degree from year to year. Therefore, the following hypothesis is set:  
H2c: An association exists between litigious environment and change in 
FLFD. 
Managerial ownership: Agency theory suggests a positive association between managerial 
ownership and narrative reporting because managerial ownership could serve to align 
interests of management with those of other shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Empirical literature, however, suggests results that contradict with agency theory. For 
instance, prior studies (e.g., Barakat & Hussainey, 2013) find a negative association between 
managerial ownership and voluntary disclosure. In particular, literature reports negative 
association between FLFD and managerial ownership (Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2011; Wang 
& Hussainey, 2013). Based on the agency theory, firms with higher managerial ownership 
are more likely to change their FLFD over years to provide informative disclosure to their 
investors. Therefore, the following hypothesis is set:  
H2d: A positive association exists between managerial ownership and 
change in FLFD.  
Auditor type: Healy and Palepu (2001) suggest that hiring high quality auditors is a mean 
for a company to distinguish itself from others. High quality auditors can play an important 
role in improving firms’ overall reporting (Hail, 2002). The Companies Act 1985 requires 
auditors to state whether the information given in the OFR for the financial year for which 
the annual accounts are prepared is consistent with those accounts, and whether any matters 
have come to their attention in the performance of their functions as auditors of the company, 
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which in their opinion are inconsistent with the information given in the OFR. Hence, large 
auditors may influence managers to provide more informative disclosure in OFR statements. 
Therefore, our hypothesis is: 
H2e: A positive association exists between auditor type and change in FLFD.  
 
2.2.2 Investors’ response to change in FLFD 
The informativeness of FLFD is still under research (Wang & Hussainey, 2013). OFR 
statements are an important venue for investors to know more about the company from the 
eyes of the board of directors, and through which managers can communicate what cannot 
be delivered by financial statements numbers. The change in FLFD is, thus, expected to be 
useful as it reveals considerable new information for investors.   
On the other hand, managers have flexibility in how and what information to disclose, 
therefore, they may use their disclosure discretion to mislead investors (Marquardt & 
Wiedman, 2005). Li (2008) concludes that managers can use their discretion in preparing 
narrative reporting to strategically obfuscate the financial results. Likewise, Athanasakou 
and Hussainey (2014) argue that managers use future-oriented information when they have 
incentives to provide untruthful disclosure and mislead investors. If so, even if managers 
update their discussion according to change in firm performance, investors will not have a 
clear view of the business and, therefore, their response to FLFD in OFR statements may be 
faint. Furthermore, the doubt about the usefulness of OFR statements can arise from the 
relative lack of the timeliness of an annual report. Even if FLFD is changed in good faith 
and managers provide clear analysis regarding business performance, the information is 
likely to be forestalled by other disclosure media.  
Investors’ response to change in FLFD is measured by future firm value. Generally, better 
information environment is associated with higher market valuation (Lang, Lins, & Miller, 
2004). High-quality disclosure enhances investors’ perceptions of firms; in turn, such 
perceptions are reflected in firm value (Healy, Hutton, & Palepu, 1999). Finance theory 
suggests that disclosure can affect firm value either by affecting its cost of capital or/and its 
expected cash flow (Hassan, Romilly, Giorgioni, & Power, 2009). The empirical evidence 
regarding the influence of disclosure on firm value is still inclusive. Some studies maintain 
that narrative disclosure adds to firm value (e.g., Cheung, Jiang, & Tan, 2010; Elzahar, 
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Hussainey, Mazzi, & Tsalavoutas, 2015), while, others (e.g., Hassan et al., 2009) do not find 
evidence to support this assumption. Obviously, the association between change in FLFD 
and firm value has not been investigated in prior research.  
Based on finance theory, an investor’s decision to buy or hold a company’s financial 
securities depends on his or her expectations regarding its future cash flow. The investor 
expectation is based on exploiting all available information. The information released as a 
result of change in FLFD over years may help investors to build their expectations about 
future cash flows and, thus, affects firm value. Therefore, we hypothesise that  
H3: An association exists between the change in FLFD and firm value. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN  
3.1 Measuring change in FLFD  
The automated content analysis technique is employed, and sentence is used as the unit of 
the analysis. To measure the change in FLFD, the following four steps are followed.  
First, forward-looking sentences are extracted from OFR statements based on a list of 33 
forward-looking keywords. Appendix 1 details the list of keywords. Besides, conjugations 
are used with verbs that imply future to reduce the likelihood of capturing noun forms of 
some verbs (such as “the company plans to ….”). Furthermore, numerical reference to future 
years is added (e.g., 2008/2009 is made when searching in the OFR statements of 2007). 
Second, financial-related sentences are extracted from OFR statements based on a list of 
financial-related keywords. Appendix 1, also, details the list of the financial-related 
keywords  
Third, using the QSR N6 software, we search OFR statements for sentences that include 
both a forward-looking keyword and a financial-related keyword. This helps in counting the 
frequency of FLFD in a firm’s OFR statements each year. Finally, the change in FLFD, 
ΔFLFD, is equal to FLFD in period t minus FLFD in period t-1. This measures the extent to 
which FLFD in two successive OFR documents are different. A higher score indicates more 
changes from the previous year and vice versa.  
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To assess the reliability of the change score, a randomly selected sample from OFR 
statements is manually coded, and change score is calculated based on the manual coding. 
Following Hussianey et al. (2003), the Pearson correlation is used to compare between the 
change score from manual coding and the change score from automated coding. A Pearson 
correlation shows that the change score based on manual coding is significantly correlated 
with the change score from automated coding. This suggests that the change score calculated 
based on computer software is reliable.  
Following Botosan (1997) and Brown and Tucker (2011), the current study validates the 
disclosure change measure by analysing the association between change score and some 
firm characteristics that are identified in prior research as determinates of voluntary 
disclosure. Further, as reported in the empirical analysis in section 4.2.1, the study finds 
associations between change score and firm characteristics (e.g., firm size, competitive 
environment, litigious environment, & percentage of managerial ownership). This adds 
validity to the idea that change in the level of disclosure captures new information. 
3.2 Empirical models  
To test H1 and H2, the study controls for some economic environment variables that are 
identified as determinants of FLFD in prior research. Changes in these variables reveal 
relatively new information for managers to disclose which, in turn, affects managers’ 
decision to change FLFD. These variables include: leverage, dividend, liquidity, and market 
risk exposure. Besides, we control for overall change in the length of the narrative document 
using change in its total statements. Finally, FLFD may be changed from the previous year 
because of the implementation of new narrative reporting requirements and accounting 
standards. Therefore, the year-fixed effect is used to control for change in FLFD due to this 
reason. Equation (1) summarises the empirical model. Table (1) elaborates the definitions 
and measurements of variables 
|𝜟𝑭𝑳𝑭𝑫| =  𝜷𝟎 +  𝜷𝟏|𝜟𝑹𝑶𝑬| + 𝜷𝟐𝑳𝒏𝑴𝑲 + 𝜷𝟑𝑯𝒆𝒓𝒇 + 𝜷𝟒𝑳𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒈 + 𝜷𝟓%𝑴𝑶 +
                        𝜷𝟔𝑩𝒊𝒈𝑵 + 𝜷𝟕|𝜟𝑳𝒆𝒗|  + 𝜷𝟖|𝜟𝑫𝒀| + 𝜷𝟗|𝜟𝑪𝑹| + 𝜷𝟏𝟎|𝜟𝑹𝒆𝒕. 𝑽𝒐𝒍| +
                       𝜷𝟏𝟏|𝜟𝑻. 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕| +  𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝑭𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅 𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕 + 𝜺                                           (1) 
Where:  
 
𝜷𝟎  The regression intercept  
𝜷𝟏….. 𝜷𝟏𝟏 The regression coefficients  
𝜺 The error term  
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Insert Table (1) about here 
 
To test H3, we calculate the value of the firm at three months of the annual report date. This 
procedure ensures that stock prices capture the new information released by change in FLFD 
(Hassan et al., 2009). The value of the firm is measured using the natural logarithm of firm 
Tobin’s Q ratio and refers to this variable as LnTQ+3. In the multivariate analysis, we control 
for variables that may affect firm value. These variables include: firm size, current earnings, 
leverage, dividends, liquidity, firm growth, capital expenditures, and managerial ownership. 
Besides, we use the industry-fixed effect to control for industry-specific characteristics that 
may affect firm value. Equation (2) summarises the empirical model. Table (2) elaborates 
the definitions and measurements of variables 
𝑳𝒏𝑻𝑸+𝟑 =  𝜷𝟎 +  𝜷𝟏|𝜟𝑭𝑳𝑭𝑫| + 𝜷𝟐𝑳𝒏𝑴𝑲 + 𝜷𝟑𝑹𝑶𝑬 + 𝜷𝟒𝑳𝒆𝒗 +  𝜷𝟓𝑫𝒀 +  𝜷𝟔𝑪𝑹
+ 𝜷𝟕𝑮𝑹𝑻𝑯 + 𝜷𝟖𝑪𝑨𝑷𝑬𝑿 + 𝜷𝟗%𝑴𝑶 +  𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝑭𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅 𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕
+ 𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒚 𝑭𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅 𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕 +  𝜺                                                               (𝟐)   
Where:  
 
𝜷𝟎  The regression intercept  
𝜷𝟏….. 𝜷𝟗 The regression coefficients  
𝜺 The error term  
 
Insert Table (2) about here 
 
The study estimates models (1) & (2) using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression with 
clustered robust standard errors. This method allows standard errors to be clustered by firms 
to account for any residual dependence created by firm effects. The clustered standard error 
is used to mitigate the problem of time series dependence (auto-correlation). Petersen (2009) 
shows that this estimation method yields unbiased standard errors and, consequently, would 
improve the accuracy of the analyses. In addition, the study uses the year-fixed effect to 
address the effect of cross-sectional dependence or time effects (heteroskedasticity). We do 
not cluster by years in the analyses because the panel data set is short in the time series and 
clustering by six years may only add noise to the system (Petersen, 2009). To mitigate the 
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effect of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile. All 
change variables are winsorised before taking the absolute value.  
3.3 Sample selection and data collection 
This study examines change in FLFD in OFR statements of the FTSE all-shares firms listed 
on the London Stock Exchange. The sample covers annual reports for fiscal years 2005-
2011. It starts with 2005 because the reporting standard RS1 on OFR was issued in 20051 
and ends the analysis with 2011; the most recent annual reports available at the time of the 
analysis. Following prior research (e.g., Elshandidy, Fraser, & Hussainey, 2013; Elzahar et 
al., 2015), financial firms are excluded. In addition, we exclude observations 1) whose 
annual reports for the current or the previous year are missing, 2) whose annual reports 
cannot be converted into text file to be readable by QSR N6 software, 3) whose return on 
equity ratios for the current year or the previous year are missing, and 4) that changed the 
month of year-end during the period. This leaves us with 1,912 firm-year observations. Table 
(3) displays the final sample sorted by industries.   
Insert Table (3) about here 
Annual reports are read to identify OFR statements. When identifying OFR statements we 
find that there is a rarely definitive section entitled OFR. Table (4) presents different titles 
that report OFR contents2. 
Insert Table (4) about here 
Annual reports are collected from companies’ official websites, the Thomson one banker 
database and the Northcote website (www.northcote.co.uk). All financial data is collected 
form Datastream. Auditor type data is manually collected from the companies’ annual 
reports.  
                                               
1 On 28 November 2005, the mandatory requirement for OFR was cancelled. RS1 has been withdrawn, and 
the ASB has converted RS1 into a Reporting Statement of best practice on the OFR, which is considered 
voluntary rather than mandatory. On 1 October 2007, Business Review requirements came into effect. Recently, 
an entity may apply the Management Commentary practice statements from December 2010. Obviously, the 
Business Review and Management Commentary require companies to provide broadly the same information 
on narrative matters as the earlier OFR. 
 
2 This is consistent with the survey conducted by the ASB in 2009. The survey concludes that companies are 
titling their narrative reporting sections using a variety of names, such as Business Review, OFR, or 
Performance Review, as well as, the Chairman’s and Chief Executive’s Reviews (ASB, 2009).  
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4. FINDINGS  
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A (B) of Table (5) shows the descriptive statistics of continuous variables (the 
frequencies for dummy variables). The maximum value of |ΔFLFD| of the sampled firms is 
58, while, the minimum is 0. This indicates that a variation exists between UK firms in terms 
of their decision to change FLFD from year to year. The sample firms have, on average, 
change score from the previous year of 4.202.  
The maximum value of |ΔROE| is 23.17, while, the minimum is 0.01. This suggests 
significant variation between UK firms in terms of their earnings performance. On average, 
the sampled firms have year-over-year change in performance of 9.394. The maximum value 
of LnTQ+3 of the sampled firms is 0.894, while, the minimum is -0.823. This indicates that 
a variation exists between UK firms in terms of their values.  
Insert Table (5) about here 
 
The Pearson correlation matrix, not tabulated, provides an evidence that change in FLFD is 
statistically correlated positively with change in firm performance (p<0.01). In addition, 
change in FLFD is significantly associated with all other explanatory variables except for 
|ΔRet.Vol|. Some of these significant associations, especially firm size (LnMK), competitive 
environment (Herf), litigious environment (Litig), and percentage of managerial ownership 
(%MO) are consistent with prior research (e.g., Brown & Tucker, 2011), which add to the 
validity of our change measure. Furthermore, the Pearson correlation, not tabulated, 
indicates that the future firm value (LnTQ+3) is not statistically correlated with change in 
FLFD. However, it is statistically correlated with all other explanatory variables. 
We, also, calculate the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) after carrying out each regression 
model to check for multicolinearity problem. If the VIF value is more than 10, this suggests 
multicollinearity (Field, 2009). The mean and maximum values of VIF tests are tabulated 
with the regression results and indicate that there is no concern about this problem.  
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4.2 Multivariate analysis 
4.2.1 Change in FLFD and change in firm performance  
Table (6) reports the multivariate results which are robust to heteroskedasticity and auto-
correlation. Columns (1) & (2) provide the estimation of model (1) in two different ways. 
Column (1) uses the absolute values of change in earnings performance. This estimation 
preserves the magnitude of change in earnings performance. Column (2) uses the quartile 
ranking of absolute change in earnings performance with 1 being the smallest absolute 
change group and 4 being the largest absolute change group. This approach allows us to 
examine whether firms with larger changes in earnings performance change their FLFD 
more than those with smaller performance changes. Furthermore, this approach mitigates 
the influences of extreme values and relaxes the OLS linearity assumption (Brown & 
Tucker, 2011). Because of these advantages, column (2) is treated as the primary analysis. 
The t- Statistics presented in parentheses are based on standard error clustered by firms.  
The model in columns (1) & (2) is statistically significant (P<.01) and the adjusted R-
squared values are 14.51% and 13.99%, respectively. These values imply a good overall 
model fit which suggest that the model explains some variation in |ΔFLFD|.  
In column (1), the coefficient of |ΔROE| is 0.0017 and is statistically significant (t = 4.26). 
This means that |ΔFLFD| is positively associated with |ΔROE|. In column (2), the coefficient 
of |ΔROE| is 0.1809, and is statistically significant at 10% level of significance (t = 1.71). 
This indicates that firms with larger changes in their earnings performance change their 
FLFD more than those with smaller performance changes. The results suggest that firms 
change their FLFD in response to changes in their earnings performance. In addition, firms 
with larger changes in their earnings performance are likely to change their FLFD more than 
those with smaller performance changes. Therefore, H1a and H1b are accepted. 
These results are consistent with the managers’ incentive theories and empirical research. 
Managers’ incentive theories suggest that managers with new information relative to the 
prior year are more likely to disclose it voluntarily to reduce both information asymmetry 
and agency costs. The results, also, are consistent with prior empirical research that suggests 
that change in disclosure is associated with change in firm performance (e.g., Lang & 
Lundholm, 1993; Miller, 2002; Merkley, 2014). Furthermore, they are consistent with 
Brown and Tucker (2011) who find that firms with larger changes in their economic 
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environment variables tend to change their narratives in MD&A more than those with 
smaller changes in their economic environment.  
Obviously, there is a weak statistical significance level (t = 1.71) that firms with larger 
changes in their earnings performance are likely to change their FLFD more than those with 
smaller performance changes. This may be due to the qualitative soft talk nature FLFD. This 
nature may encourage managers to use the previous year’s FLFD as templates without 
making extremely significant changes, which, in turn, reduces the variation of change in 
FLFD.  
Insert Table (6) about here 
In this part, changes in firms’ earnings performance are held constant to examine the factors 
associated with change in FLFD. As mentioned before, column (2) is treated as the primary 
analysis. 
Consistent with H2a, the coefficient on LnMK is 0.2938 and is statistically significant (t = 
2.95). This suggests that larger firms change their FLFD to a greater degree than smaller 
firms. This may be because large firms are under pressure to disclose value relevant 
information to their investors (signalling theory), or to avoid political costs of being 
perceived as disclosing boilerplate statements. In addition, small firms are more likely to cut 
and paste narratives from previous years to save preparation costs. 
The coefficient on Herf is 46.2672 and is statistically significant (t = 2.57). This suggests 
that firms facing more competition are less likely to change their FLFD. Therefore, H2b is 
accepted. This is consistent with the proprietary cost of disclosure expectation and prior 
empirical research (e.g., Brown & Tucker, 2011). Moreover, the coefficient on Litig is 
-.7629 and is statistically significant (t = -2.04), indicating that firms in more litigious 
environment are less likely to change their FLFD. Thus, H2c is accepted. This result is 
consistent with the theoretical expectation of litigation costs of disclosure. The results on 
both competitive and litigious environments suggest that firms facing more costs of 
disclosure are less likely to provide informative narrative reporting.  
The coefficient on %MO is -1.4811 and is statistically significant (t = -2.21). This indicates 
a negative association between percentage of managerial ownership and change in FLFD. 
However, this result is statistically significant; H2d is rejected due to the direction of the 
result. The result is not consistent with agency theory; however, it is consistent with prior 
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studies (e.g., Wang & Hussainey, 2013; Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2011). Furthermore, the 
coefficient on BigN is .337 and is not statistically significant (t = 1.21), meaning that no 
relationship exists between auditor type and change in FLFD. Therefore, H2e is rejected. 
This result suggests that the role of the auditor in overseeing FLFD is limited. This may be 
because the ASB enforcement actions on auditors are small. Besides, the qualitative nature 
of FLFD in the UK narratives makes it difficult to be audited.  
In sum, by holding changes in firm current earnings performance constant, the study finds 
that change in FLFD is positively (negatively) associated with firm size, (competitive 
environment), (litigious environment), and (percentage of managerial ownership). This 
result adds more validity to the change score.  
In terms of economic environment control variables, the coefficient on |ΔDY| is .2514 and 
is statistically significant at 10% level of significance (t = 1.72). The result suggests that 
firms change their FLFD in response to changes in their dividends. This is consistent with 
managers’ incentive theories. As well, the coefficient on |ΔT.Stat.| is .0018 and is 
statistically significant (t = 2.28). This suggests that firms change their FLFD as long as they 
change the length of their narrative document from year to year. On the other hand, the 
coefficients on |ΔLev|, |ΔCR|, and |ΔRet.Vol| are .0066 (t = 0.74), 0042 (t = .03), and 1.0224 
(t = 1.11), respectively. These results indicate that change in FLFD is not affected by changes 
in firm leverage, liquidity and business risk. 
4.2.2 Investors’ response to change in FLFD  
Panel A of Table (7) reports the multivariate results of model (2) where the estimation is 
robust to heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation. The model is statistically significant 
(P<.01) and adjusted R- squared is 36.53%. These values imply a good overall model fit 
which explains some variation in firm value. The t-Statistics presented in parentheses are 
based on standard error clustered by firm. 
The coefficient of LnTQ+3 on |∆FLFD| is -.0059 and is statistically significant (t = -2.16). 
This indicates that LnTQ+3 is negatively associated with |∆FLFD|. The result suggests that 
the future value of a firm decreases as it changes its FLFD from the previous year. Because 
the main objective of the current study is not the direction of the relation, but, the existence 
of such association between firm value and change in FLFD, the H3 hypothesis is accepted 
that an association exists between change in FLFD and firm value. 
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The result is consistent with finance theory, which suggests that an investor’s decision to 
buy or hold firm financial securities depends on his/ her expectations regarding its future 
cash flow. The investor’s expectation is based on exploiting all available information. The 
information released as a result of change in FLFD from the previous year may help 
investors to build their expectations about the required rate of return. Consequently, this 
affects the future value of the firm. However, this result is not consistent with prior research 
(e.g., Cheung et al., 2010: Elzahar et al., 2015) who finds that narrative disclosure adds to 
firm value. The further analysis, in section 5, may provide more understanding of such 
association. 
Insert Table (7) about here 
In terms of the control variables, the coefficient on firm size (LnMK) and firm current 
earnings performance (ROE) is .0871 (t = 7.09) and .0110 (t = 7.49), respectively. This 
suggests that larger firms and firms with higher earnings are more likely to exhibit higher 
values in the future. This is consistent with prior research (e.g., Hassan et al., 2009). 
Moreover, the coefficient on DY is -.0350 (t = -4.36), suggesting that firms with higher 
dividends payments are less likely to have higher values in the future. This is consistent with 
Officer (2011) who finds that firms with lower values have significantly more positive 
dividend initiation announcement than other firms.  
Furthermore, the coefficient on firm liquidity (CR) is .0859 (t = 3.08) suggesting that firms 
with higher liquidity exhibit higher values in the future. Similarly, the coefficients on firm 
growth (GRTH) and capital expenditure (CAPEX) are .0034 (t = 2.13) and .0095 (t = 2.33), 
respectively. These results indicate that firms with higher growth and higher capital 
expenditures are more likely to have higher values in the future. Finally, the coefficients for 
future firm value on managerial ownership (%MO) and leverage (Lev) are non-significant. 
5. FURTHER ANALYSIS 
5.1 Well-performing and poorly performing firms 
In this section, we examine whether the association between change in FLFD and change in 
earnings performance differ based on the sign of earnings change. Then, we examine 
whether change in FLFD can affect the value of firms with earnings increase and decrease 
differently. To this end, the sample is divided into two subsamples: well-performing and 
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poorly performing firms based on the direction of change in ROE. Firms with positive 
change in ROE from the previous year (ΔROE>0) are regarded as well-performing firms, 
while, firms with negative change in ROE (ΔROE<0) are considered poorly performing 
firms.  
Columns (1) & (2) of Table (8) provide estimation of model (1) for samples of well-
performing and poorly performing firms, respectively. While, the coefficient on |ΔROE| for 
well-performing firms is .0008 and is statistically significant at the 10% level of significance 
(t = 1.73), the coefficient on |ΔROE| for poorly performing firms is .0025 and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level of significance (t = 5.94). This result indicates that a positive 
association exists between change in earnings performance and change in FLFD for both 
well-performing and poorly performing firms. However, this association is more positive 
and statistically significant for poorly performing firms compared to well-performing firms.  
These results may be rationalised from two perspectives. First, managers of well-performing 
firms feel that their investors are satisfied with their good performance and, consequently, 
they would not wish for more information (Wallace & Naser, 1995). Second, managers of 
poorly performing firms react to bad earnings performance by increasing discussions on 
activities with potential positive effect on future performance (Merkley, 2014). This 
suggests that poorly performing firms are more likely to provide informative narrative 
disclosure than well-performing firms. 
Consistently, prior empirical research in the UK finds that forward-looking information is 
more likely to be used by un-profitable firms than by profitable firms (Hussainey & Al-
Najjar, 2011; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). In addition, Schleicher et al. (2007) find that loss-
making firms provide more relevant forward-looking information to their investors than 
profit-making firms.  
Insert Table (8) about here 
In terms of the impact on the future firm value, Panel B of Table (7) reports the estimation 
of model (2) for samples of well-performing and poorly performing firms separately in 
columns (1) & (2), respectively. For well- performing firms, the coefficient on |∆FLFD| is -
.0040 and is not statistically significant (t = -1.26), suggesting that the change in FLFD has 
no effect on the value of well-performing firms. This may be due to the lack of the timeliness 
of the annual reports.  
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Concerning poorly performing firms, the coefficient on |∆FLFD| is -.0074 and is statistically 
significant (t = -2.26). This result suggests that the values of poorly performing firms 
decrease as long as these firms change their FLFD from year to year. This negative effect 
could be explained from two different angles. First, managers may use their discretion in 
preparing narrative disclosure to strategically obfuscate the financial results – that is actually 
poor – and this may be perceived as a way of misleading investors about an actual firm 
performance. Consequently, investors respond negatively to disclosure. Second, information 
could cause noise to investors (Cheng, Su, & Zhu, 2012). Therefore, it may negatively affect 
the value of the firm.  
5.2 Robustness test 
This section presents a sensitivity analysis test to assess the robustness of the results on the 
usefulness of change in FLFD. One of the concerns of Tobin’s Q as a measure of a firm 
value is that it widely varies from industry to another (Abdullah & Page, 2009). Therefore, 
an alternative measure of firm value is used to test the robustness of the results. 
The study computes an industry median adjusted Tobin’s Q for each year. This Tobin’s Q 
controls for potential bias arising from industry (Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell, 2009), and 
rules out the potential for simultaneity (Brown & Caylor, 2006). In addition, it helps to 
mitigate endogeneity. The industry-median adjusted Tobin’s Q is computed as a firm 
Tobin’s Q minus the median Tobin’s Q in the firm industry in the observation year.  
Model (2) is re-estimated using the industry median adjusted Tobin’s Q as dependent 
variable. Results are similar to those shown in Table 7. 
 
6. CONCLUSION  
This study is the first in the UK to examine to what extent FLFD is changed in response to 
changes in performance. In addition, it investigates the effect of such change in FLFD on 
the future value of a firm. The results suggest an association between change in firms’ 
earnings performance and change in FLFD. In addition, firms with larger change in earnings 
performance are likely to change FLFD more than those with smaller performance changes. 
Further, when we distinguish between well and poorly performing firms, the study finds that 
poorly performing firms are likely to change FLFD more than well-performing firms. This 
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suggests that poorly performing firms provide more informative disclosure to their investors 
than well-performing firms. Furthermore, the results indicate that change in FLFD neither 
affects the future value of well-performing firms, nor enhances the investors’ valuation of 
the poorly performing firm. Therefore, FLFD in UK narratives is not really informative.     
The study has implications for the emphasis in the UK regulatory bodies (e.g., IASB) on 
setting clear best practise guidance for narrative reporting. In the UK, managers have 
flexibility in terms of the amounts and contents of narrative disclosure. This room of 
discretion may encourage managers to strategically obscure the financial results in their 
narrative discussion. In this case, narratives are a mean for managers to mislead investors. 
Thus, guidance has to be set for managers, while, preparing their narrative discussions.  
Furthermore, the results have important implications for users of annual report narratives. 
The importance of the narrative discussion and analysis in the annual report depends 
concomitantly on firm performance. In the UK, this narrative discussion is not currently 
subject to external audit or assurance. The results suggest that users of annual reports may 
desire some element of assurance that this narrative discussion is consistent with firm 
performance. The external auditors may be able and willing to provide such assurance.  
The study, despite of the robustness tests, has some limitations which have to be considered 
as potential avenues for future research. First, the change score employed in the current 
study is based on the idea that a company will disclose considerable new information as long 
as it changes its level of disclosure. However, a firm may keep its FLFD level the same over 
years, but disclose relatively new information. Perhaps for this reason, it would be an 
interesting area for future research to look for other sophisticated measures of change in 
narrative disclosure. However, our measure is not perfect; it is one step forward in 
understanding managers’ narrative disclosure behaviour. Second, the study uses only two 
proxies for governance that are managerial ownership and auditor type. It would be 
interesting to consider other corporate governance mechanisms in future research. 
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Table 1 
Model (1) variables: Definitions and measurements  
Definition Acronym Operationalization 
   
Change score in  
FLFD 
|ΔFLFD| Change score in FLFD as measured in section 3.1. 
   
Firm performance  |ΔROE| Year-over-year absolute change in firm return of 
equity. Datastream code: WC08301.  
   
Firm size  LnMK Natural logarithm of market value of equity at the end 
of the current year. Datastream code: WC08001. 
   
Competitive 
environment  
Herf Herfendahl index measured using the 100 firms [or 
less if the number of firms is less than 100] with the 
highest sales in the industry [the Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB) is used for industry 
identification]. The lower the Herf, the less 
concentrated the industry, the higher the competition, 
and the higher the potential proprietary costs (Botosan 
& Stanford, 2005). 
   
Litigious 
environment 
Litig Industry classification measured using dummy 
variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is in technology 
industry and 0 otherwise.  
   
Auditor type  BigN Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is 
audited by one of the big 4 audit firms and 0 
otherwise. 
   
Managerial  
ownership 
%MO                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     The percentage of total shares held by employees, or
by those with a substantial position in a company that 
provides significant voting power at an annual general 
meeting. Datastream code: NOSHEM. 
   
Leverage  |ΔLev| Year-over-year absolute change in firm Debt to equity 
ratio. Datastream code: WC08231. 
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Dividend  |ΔDY| Year-over-year absolute change in firm dividend 
yield at the end of the fiscal year. Datastream code: 
WC09404. 
   
Liquidity  |ΔCR| Year-over-year absolute change in firm current ratio. 
Datastream code: WC08106. 
   
Risk exposure  |ΔRet.Vol| Year-over-year absolute changes in firm return 
volatility. Datastream code: 458E.  
   
Document length   |ΔT.Stat| Year-over-year absolute change in the total 
statements of firm OFR section. 
This Table provides the definitions and measurements of variables in model (1). 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Model (2) variables: Definitions and measurements  
Definition Acronym Operationalization 
   
Firm value  LnTQ+3 Natural logarithm of Firm Tobin’s Q three months 
after the date of annual report: Tobin’s Q = [(total debt 
+ market value of equity) / book value of total assets]. 
The market value of equity is calculated as the number 
of outstanding shares at the year-end multiplied by the 
market value of the share at three months after the 
annual report date. 
   
Firm size  LnMK Natural logarithm of market value of equity at the end 
of the current year. Datastream code: WC08001. 
   
Current earnings  ROE Firm return of equity. Datastream code: WC08301. 
   
Leverage  Lev Debt to equity ratio. Datastream code: WC08231. 
   
Dividend  DY Dividend yield ratio. Datastream code: WC09402. 
   
Liquidity  CR Current ratio. Datastream code: WC08106. 
   
Firm growth  GRTH Firm sales growth ratio. Datastream code: 
WC08633. 
   
Capital expenditure  CAPEX Capital expenditure to assets ratio. Datastream code: 
WC08420. 
   
Managerial 
ownership 
%MO The percentage of total shares held by employees, or 
by those with a substantial position in a company that 
provides significant voting power at an annual general 
meeting. Datastream code: NOSHEM. 
This Table provides the definitions and measurements of variables in model (2). 
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Table 3 
Distribution of the sample amongst industries  
Industry  N Percentage 
Industrial  661 35% 
Basic materials  149 8% 
Technology  191 10% 
Consumer goods  211 11% 
Consumer services  427 22% 
Health care  115 6% 
Oil and gas  100 5% 
Utilities  36 2% 
Telecommunication  22 1% 
Total  1,912 100% 
This Table provides the distribution of the sample among industries. The definitions of the industries are based 
on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB). 
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Table 4 
Different titles that report OFR contents  
 N Percentage 
OFR 293 15% 
Operating review/ Financial review  326 17% 
Business review  665 35% 
Chief executive review 535 28% 
Operating review  59 3% 
Financial review  34 2% 
Total  1,912 100% 
This Table reports different titles for OFR contents. Firms produce OFR statements under the title OFR; or 
report two separate sections Operating Review and Financial Review; or produce the same OFR contents 
under the title Business Review; or under the title Chief Executive Review; or produce either only an 
Operating Review or a Financial Review. 
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Table 5 
Sample descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Continuous variables  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
|ΔFLFD| 1,912 4.202 5.059 0.00 58.00 
|ΔROE| 1,912 9.394 7.927 0.01 23.17 
LnTQ+3 1,912 -0.010 0.545 -0.823 0.894 
LnMK 1,912 12.410 1.892 9.591 15.437 
Herf 1,912 0.009 0.014 0.0002 0.045 
%MO 1,912 0.087 0.1566 0.00 0.99 
ROE 1,912 14.481 14.374 -8.95 40.41 
Lev 1,912 52.706 53.160 0.00 166.96 
DY 1,912 2.653 2.053 0.00 6.21 
CR 1,912 1.614 0.826 0.68 3.35 
GRTH 1,912 8.752 10.129 -6.86 26.48 
CAPEX 1,912 5.394 5.109 0.85 17.23 
|ΔLev| 1,912 15.168 14.698 0.00 40.4 
|ΔDY| 1,912 0.912 0.898 0.00 2.71 
|ΔCR| 1,912 0.223 0.173 0.001 0.50 
|ΔRet.Vol| 1,912 0.196 0.140 0.00 0.41 
|ΔT.Stat| 1,912 135.42 120.443 6.00 568 
 
Panel B: Dummy variables  
Variable  Dummies N % 
Litig 
0 1,722 90% 
1 191 10% 
    
BigN 
0 327 17% 
1 1,586 83% 
This Table provides the descriptive statistics for all variables. Panel A (B) shows the descriptive statistics 
of continuous variables (the frequencies for dummy variables). 
Tables 1 & 2 define all variables. 
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Table 6 
Model (1) results: Incentives to change FLFD 
   (1) (2) 
 
Variables 
Pred. 
Sign 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Constant   
-.4487  
(-0.32) 
-1.1353 
(-0.82) 
Performance |ΔROE| + 
.0017*** 
(4.26) 
.1809* 
(1.71) 
Size  LnMK + 
.2651*** 
(2.64) 
.2938*** 
(2.95) 
Competitive 
environment  
Herf + 
47.6255*** 
(2.64) 
46.2672*** 
(2.57) 
Litigious environment Litig +/- 
-.8120** 
(-2.15) 
-.7629** 
(-2.04) 
Managerial ownership  %MO + 
-1.7284*** 
(-2.73) 
-1.4811*** 
(-2.21) 
Auditor type  BigN + 
.3395 
(1.23) 
.3370 
(1.21) 
Leverage  |ΔLev| + 
.0063 
(0.75) 
.0066097 
(0.74) 
Dividend  |ΔDY| + 
.2546* 
(1.75) 
.2514* 
(1.72) 
Liquidity  |ΔCR| + 
.0194 
(0.13) 
.0042 
(0.03) 
Business risk  |ΔRet. Vol| + 
1.1906 
(1.27) 
1.0224   
(1.11) 
Document length  |ΔT.Stat.| + 
.0017** 
(2.26) 
.0018** 
(2.28) 
Fixed effect Year Year 
Standard error clustering  Firm  Firm  
Model F 
Prob > F 
11.80*** 
0.0000 
10.74*** 
0.0000 
Adjusted R- squared 14.51% 13.99% 
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VIF: Mean 
         Max.  
1.35 
2.18 
1.37 
2.18 
Observation (N) 1,912 1,912 
This Table reports the coefficients’ estimates of model (1). Column (1) uses the absolute values of change 
in earnings performance, while, column (2) uses the quartile ranking of absolute change in earnings 
performance with 1 being the smallest absolute change group and 4 being the largest absolute change group. 
The t-Statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard error clustered by firms to control for auto-
correlation and heteroskedasticity.  
Table 1 defines all variables. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Model (2) results : Change in FLFD impact on firm value 
   Panel A Panel B 
   All sampled 
firms 
(1) 
ΔROE>0 
(2) 
ΔROE<0 
 
Variables 
Pred. 
Sign 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Constant   
-1.6249*** 
(-6.70) 
-1.6590*** 
(-7.34)   
-1.4050*** 
(-6.85) 
Forward-looking 
financial disclosure  
|∆FLFD| +/- 
-.0059** 
(-2.16) 
-.0040 
(-1.26) 
-.0074** 
(-2.26)   
Firm’s size   LnMK + 
.0871*** 
(7.09)   
.0880*** 
(6.05) 
.0874*** 
(6.77) 
Profitability  ROE + 
.0110*** 
(7.49) 
.0120*** 
(6.55) 
.0098*** 
(6.39) 
Leverage   Lev +/- 
.00005 
(0.16) 
-.0003 
(-0.83) 
.0005 
(0.213) 
Dividend   DY +/- 
-.0350*** 
(-4.36) 
-.0348*** 
(-3.28) 
-.03853*** 
(-4.28) 
Liquidity  CR + 
.08597*** 
(3.08) 
.0917*** 
(2.98) 
.0837*** 
(2.68) 
Firm growth  GRTH + 
.0034** 
(2.13) 
.0063*** 
(3.18) 
.0006 
(0.34) 
Capital expenditures  CAPEX + 
.0095** 
(2.33) 
.0068 
(1.45) 
.0106** 
(2.43) 
Managerial ownership  %MO +/- 
.1051 
(0.72) 
.0914 
(0.65) 
.1265 
(0.71) 
Fixed effect 
Year& 
Industry  
Year& 
Industry  
Year & 
Industry 
Standard error clustering  Firm  Firm  Firm  
Model F 
Prob > F 
74.42*** 
.0000 
27.46*** 
.0000 
29.56*** 
.0000 
Adjusted R- squared 36.53% 37.21% 34.85% 
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VIF: Mean 
         Max. 
1.33 
1.49 
1.42 
1.84 
1.46 
1.92 
Observation (N) 1,912 946 966 
This Table reports the coefficients’ estimates of model (2). Panel A reports the estimation for all sampled firms. 
Whilst, panel B provides the estimation for well and poorly performing firms in columns 1 & 2, respectively. The t-
Statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard error clustered by firms to control for auto-correlation and 
heteroskedasticity. 
Table 2 defines all variables 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Model (1) results: Well-performing and poorly performing firms 
   (1) 
ΔROE>0 
(2) 
ΔROE<0 
 
Variables 
Pred. 
Sign 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Constant   
-2.1794 
(-1.24) 
1.1530 
(0.85) 
Performance |ΔROE| + 
.0008* 
(1.73) 
.0025*** 
(5.94) 
Size  LnMK + 
.3347** 
(2.56) 
.1715 
(1.48) 
Competitive 
environment  
Herf + 
52.4033** 
(2.33) 
38.6538** 
(2.01) 
Litigious environment Litig +/- 
-.9159* 
(-1.89) 
-.5151 
(-1.09) 
Managerial ownership  %MO + 
-1.8560* 
(-1.96) 
-1.4982** 
(-2.01) 
Auditor type  BigN + 
.1612 
(0.37) 
.6986** 
(2.23) 
Leverage  |ΔLev| + 
.0136 
(1.15)  
-.0024 
(-0.20) 
Dividend  |ΔDY| + 
.3102 
(1.42) 
.1855 
(1.27) 
Liquidity  |ΔCR| + 
.1358 
(0.67) 
-.1175 
(-0.67) 
Business risk  |ΔRet. Vol| + 
2.0645* 
(1.76) 
-.0686 
(-0.05) 
Document length  |ΔT.Stat| + 
.0011* 
(1.66) 
.0033*** 
(3.08) 
Fixed effect Year Year 
Standard error clustering  Firm  Firm  
Model F 
Prob > F 
7.56*** 
0.0000 
11.03*** 
0.0000 
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Adjusted R- squared 15.53% 15.71% 
VIF: Mean 
         Max. 
1.34 
2.16 
1.53 
2.32 
Observation (N) 946 966 
This Table reports the coefficients’ estimates of model (1) for well and poorly performing firms, separately 
in Columns (1) & (2), respectively. The t-Statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard error 
clustered by firms to control for auto-correlation and heteroskedasticity. 
Table 1 defines all variables. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1: List of keywords 
 
Forward-looking keywords 
    
Aim  
Anticipate  
Believe  
Coming   
Estimate 
Eventual  
Expect  
Following   
Forecast  
Forthcoming  
Future   
Hope  
Incoming   
Intend  
Intention  
Likely  
Look-ahead  
Look-forward 
Next  
Plan  
Predict  
Project  
Prospect  
Seek  
Shortly  
Soon  
Subsequent   
Unlikely  
Upcoming  
Well-placed  
Well-positioned 
Will  
Year-ahead 
 
 
 
    
Financial-related keywords 
    
Amortisation 
Costs  
Depletion 
Depreciation 
Discontinued 
operations 
Dividends  
Earnings  
EBI  
EBIT  
EBITDA  
Expenses  
Extraordinary items 
Gain  
Impairment 
Income  
Loss  
Margin  
Profit  
Revenue  
Sales  
Tax  
Assets  
Capital  
Debt  
Equity  
Inventories 
Investment property 
Liabilities  
Payable  
Property plant and 
equipment  
Provisions 
Receivable Cash  
Cash flow  
Cash inflow  
Cash outflow  
Acid test ratio 
Cash flow per share  
Credit given  
Credit obtained 
Current ratio  
Dividend cover  
Dividends yield 
Earnings per share  
EPS  
Gearing  
Gross margin ratio  
Interest cover 
Liquidity ratio 
Market to book value 
ratio  
Price earnings ratio  
Profit margin  
Profitability  
Quick ratio  
Return on assets  
Return on capital 
employed  
Return on equity  
Return on investment 
ROA  
ROCE  
ROE 
Stock turnover 
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